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THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: AN APPRAISAL OF
JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURES
LEWIS DIANA
The author was probation officer for the Juvenile Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania during 1949 and 1951. Since 1951 he has been teaching in the Department of
Sociology in the University of Pittsburgh.-EDrroR

The origins of the juvenile court are to be found in the public welfare movement,
particularly as it related to children. Child welfare considerations became elaborated
into concrete protective services for children.' In the area of delinquency, reform
movements turned from conceptions of individual responsibility to the effects of
social environmental factors and concentrated their attack on protecting young
people, who were felt to be largely the victims of circumstances, from the demoralizing
influences of criminal procedures. The new approach in child welfare was supported
2
by a rising clinical ideology.
The legal roots of the juvenile court are found in the English courts of chancery
which were well established by the beginning of the fifteenth century. The chancery
courts were more flexible and administrative than the common law courts and carried
the power of parens patriae or the power of guardianship over persons, especially
children, who lacked adequate remedy at law.3 These features were incorporated in
the establishment of juvenile courts throughout the country since 1899. However,
juvenile courts generally have gone so far beyond the traditional limits of earlier
equity courts that most of them today operate not so much as judicial agencies, but
mainly as social agencies attempting the rehabilitation of a wide range of problem
cases which may or may not involve delinquency. The reaction against the extremes
of the penal code when applied to juveniles has in many jurisdictions led to the removal of virtually all procedural safeguards and to the formulation of a concept of
juvenile courts which makes of them, in effect, child guidance agencies supported
by the compelling power of the state. This concept has been reaffirmed in a recent
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In in re Holmes, Chief justice Stern
maintained :
The proceedings in such a court are not in the nature of a criminal trial but constitute merely
a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation and rehabilitation of the minor child.
Their purpose is not penal but protective-aimed to check juvenile delinquency and to throw around
a child, just starting, perhaps, on a evil course and deprived of proper parental care, the strong arm
of the State acting as parens patride. The State is not seeking to punish an offender but to salvage
a boy who may be in danger of becoming one, and to safeguard his adolescent life.
IHENRETTA L. GORDON. Report of Conference on Protective Services, Special Bulletin, Child
Welfare League of America, February 1944.
2
PAUL W. TAPPAN. JUvENILE DELINQUENcY. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949, pp. 348-349.
3Ibid., p. 7.
4 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
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Such an opinion is not new to the State of Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v.
Fisher,5 the Supreme Court declared that a child could be brought into court without
any process at all "for the purpose of subjecting it to the State's guardianship and
protection.... When the child gets there and the court, with the power to save it,
determines on its salvation and not its punishment, it is immaterial how it got there."
In short, constitutional rights granted to adults accused of crime do not apply to
children who are brought before juvenile courts. In in re Holmes, the Supreme Court
went so far as to say that:
Even from a purely technical standpoint heresay evidence, if it is admitted without objection and
is relevant and material
to the issue, is to be given its natural probative effect and may be received
6
as direct evidence.
It is apparent in many other cases that juvenile courts have been granted a vague
and broad jurisdiction and such a wide latitude of discretionary powers as enjoyed,
probably, by no other single tribunal. The reason in part may be found in the idealized
interpretations of juvenile court laws and the unquestionably desirable aims on
which those interpretations are based. Thus, the main purpose of the court is to
help the child in trouble by a process of individualized treatment, the assumption
being that there is no conflict between the child and the State.
The purpose of this paper is to examine both the logical validity of the prevailing
official attitudes toward the juvenile court and the procedures to which they give
rise in practice. The question needs to be asked, to what extent are the idealized
statements of juvenile court philosophy translated into practice? If the practice
does not measure up to stated goals, then, do the ends continue to justify the means?
JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

Definitions of delinquency in the law are very broad. The status of delinquency is
not confined to those children who are found to have violated a law. It is enough
that a child has engaged in antisocial behavior or that he has acted in such a way
as to endanger the morals or health and general welfare of himself as well as others.
But how does one decide when a child has acted in such a way? On the basis of whose
values sh6uld such decisions be made? Current conceptions of delinquency are not
consistent, nor are they such as to allow one to discriminate among different cases.
Delinquency can and should, it seems to the writer, be defined not in abstract and
vague terminology but specifically, even in degrees, although not to the extent to
which this process is carried in the criminal code. Where delinquency is not specifically
defined, adjudication too often depends upon the personal values of the judge on
the bench. Too often under such circumstances it is assumed that the mere filing
of a petition charging delinquency automatically makes a child a delinquent.
The danger in not utilizing more detailed and precise norms lies in the retention
of court jurisdiction over children who have committed no violation of law. 7 It is a
1213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905).
6379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
7 Other jurisdictions from time to time have adopted similar views: Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473,
88 Pac. 609 (1907); Rx parte Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924); Wissenburg v. Bradley,
209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1929); State v. Elbert, 115 Conn. 589, 162 Atl. 769 (1932); People v.
Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
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fundamental American belief that in order to protect individual rights there is a
presumption of innocence until or unless the reverse is proved beyond a doubt.
Juvenile court philosophy, taking its cue from social work ideology, does not speak
in terms of innocence or guilt. On the other hand, though there may be no presumptiun of guilt, there is sometimes the assumption that any child referred to the court
needs the court's "attention." The problem of delinquency is often taken for granted
or ignored.
To illustrate: The writer was assigned to investigate a case in which two boys
were accused of throwing stones through a factory window. The investigation revealed that only one of the boys had broken the window. As far as it could be determined the other boy, whom we may call Ken, was not involved except for the
fact that he had been present at the time the incident occurred. However, the judge
of the juvenile court was one who prides himself on an approach which emphasizes
not the question "Did you or did you not?" but "Why, under what circumstances,
and what can be done to help?" s Consequently, he allowed the principal of the school
which Ken attended to testify that it was reported that at one time Ken's mother used
to have the boy solicit the attention of men for her amusement and profit. The school
social worker then expressed her opinion that Ken was suffering from a "castration
complex" ! In addition, she reported that four years previously, when Ken was nine,
he reportedly had tried to take off the panties of a little girl his own age. Subsequent
discussion continued in this vein and centered about problems other than the charge
on account of which the boy had been referred. If the writer's memory serves him
well, the charge was not once mentioned at the hearing except in the probation officer's
initial summary of the case. The case of the other boy who actually was guilty, and
whose past behavior and background were even less desirable, took considerably
less time to be heard. The approach was consistent in that the emphasis was not on
"Did you or did you not?". But, the question remains, how can one legitimately
consider "Why, under what circumstances, and what can be done to help?" if the
first question is brushed aside? It is significant that in the.present case there was no
point to the second question for the boy did not. What was discussed was the boy's
alleged general behavior and background which should more properly have come
after adjudication. To take a dim view of a child's behavior and background when
no delinquency is proven and then place him on probation (the result in the case
described) is not to begin to solve his problem. The judicial process involves (1)
seeking the facts, and (2) applying the law to the ascertained facts. "Isn't it obvious,"
asks Judge Waite, "that the rights of the individual who holds the state at arm's
length and says, 'The charge is false. You have no right to interfere with me' should
be more strictly regarded during the first process before his status as someone with
whom public interference is warranted?" 9
The modem approach to delinquency with its impatience with traditional legalistic
restraints can be traced to the influence of a social work ideology. The anti-legalistic
approach which characterizes it has in some quarters assumed the importance of a
8GUSTAV L. ScHmw . Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 261: 101-108, January 1949.
9E. F. WA=TE. How Far Can Court ProcedureBe Socialized Without Impairing IndividualRights?,
Jour. of Crim. Law and Criminol., Vol. XII: 339-347, November 1921.
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vested interest. There are those, for example, who hold tenaciously to the belief
that it is the "whole child" which is important, not merely the charge brought against
him. On the other hand, whatever the meaning of "whole child," one may well ask
if the traditional rights applied to all other age groups in the population should
not also be applied to the child? Is not the consideration of such rights the inital
function of a judicial agency and a part of the picture of the "whole child"? It seems
to the writer to be a presumptuous point of view which implicitly assumes that the
juvenile court can and should handle the wide range of problems which come before
it. Where there is no violation of law on the part of the child, parents have the right
to raise their children according to their own precepts, however much any court
may be appalled at those precepts. Yet in philosophy as well as in practice, many
courts presume to take the place of parents. With the sanction of the state a juvenile
court may intervene to train children according to vague and conflicting standards,
and to help them "adjust" when in fact those who are hired by the state for this
enterprise are often far from being adjusted themselves and seldom in agreement,
even about the meaning of adjustment. There must be limitations upon the kind
of power which leaves the matter of public interference with individual lives to the
discretion of well meaning judges and social workers. In Lindsay v. Lindsay, 0 the
court insisted: "The juvenile court law should be given a broad and liberal construction, but it should not be held to extend to cases where there is merely a difference
of opinion as to the best course to pursue in rearing a child." Nor, as stated in People
v. Ctierrex," does the juvenile court law envision taking children from parents
"merely because in the estimation of probation officers and courts, the children can
be better provided for and more wisely trained as wards of the state." It should be
undeniable that parents and children have a perfect right to lead unadjusted lives,
if they please, without the authoritarian influence of court or any other agency,
so long as their behavior does not interfere with the rights of others as specifically defined
by law. Those who find legal restraints irritating obstacles placed in the path of the
impregnable goal of child welfare may do better to encourage unadjusted non-violaters
of law to seek and accept treatment in agencies other than courts. They also can
have their work cut out for them if they were to exert themselves in efforts to establish more and better facilities designed to treat problems of a non-legal character.
Ultimately, it is inconceivable how a consideration of the rights of a child can be
inconsistent with his welfare. A child as much as any other person, perhaps more
so, needs to be defended from the arbitrary and one-sided actions of others, irrespective of how well meant their intentions. In the words of justice Musmanno: "But
fairness and justice certainly recognize that a child has the right not to be a ward of
the State, not to be committed to a reformatory, not to be deprived of his liberty, if
he is innocent.""2
TnE COURT

HEARING

3

According to Sussman the informality characteristic of juvenile court hearings
does not mean that rules of evidence are to be disregarded. In practice, however,
10257 Ill.
328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913).
"47
Cal.
App.
128, 190 Pac. 200 (1920).
12 "n re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 613, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954).
11FREDERIcK B. SussMAN. LAW oF JUVENnhE DELINQUENCY. New York: Oceana Publications,
1950, p. 30.
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they usually are. Hearsay evidence is admitted and recorded and the statements of
complainants and witnesses are admitted without their presence being required in
court. It is taken as sufficient that their statements appear in the record of the investigation made by the probation officer before a case is heard in court. Indeed
sometimes statements of complainants are not obtained at all. In any event, the prehearing investigations center chiefly around social background information obtained
from parents, from school and from other interested persons and social agencies.
Diagnoses and opinions of court psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers are
also included. But even diagnoses reflect the orientation of the person making them.
Objectivity in such reports cannot be taken for granted. The whole process is further
complicated by the fact that the pre-hearing investigations are usually conducted
hurriedly and superficially. It cannot be otherwise considering the heavy case loads
of probation officers and the pressures upon them to meet court deadlines.
When the parents walk into the court room, they expect that the charge and the
circumstances leading up to it will be discussed. More often than not, however, they
are apt to feel that everything has been decided beforehand. This is not always the
case, to be sure. But most people are prepared to meet a traditional procedure and
are not aware that their statements given to the probation officer before the hearing
comprise a major segment of the entire process. When parents stand before the judge,
all the available social background information has been placed in the case record,
together with a recommendation by the probation officer and his supervisor. What
need to go into the situation further unless some new and unforeseen development
has come about? As juvenile court procedure is now set up, such a situation is largely
unavoidable but it suggests that the procedure itself should be changed. From the
point of view taken here, the court hearing should be used to determine whether or
not a child is delinquent and what the disposition shall be. The social investigation
should come after the hearing and be used to determine what specific plan of treatment would be best for any particular case.
This, however, involves other assumptions. Under a law which defines specific
delinquent acts, there should be set definite limits of time within which a child could
be committed to a correctional institution or placed on probation for various types
of offenses. There is no justification, from the writer's point of view, in incarcerating
a child or in keeping him on probation for an indefinite period because he has failed
to reach an official standard of adjustment, which may be higher than that imposed
on the average person, or on the assumption that continued commitment or probation
will bring about such an adjustment.
Under many present laws the judge of the juvenile court can establish his own
procedures. Re-hearings and appeals are few and far between. Thus, there is little if
any check upon the court. Parents usually are not advised of their rights. If they
are dissatisfied with the results of a hearing or if they feel there has been a miscarriage
of justice, they are informed they may ask for a re-hearing and then appeal. But they
are subtly discouraged from taking such a course and the fact that they can do so
as a matter of right is not a piece of information imparted to them routinely and as
a matter of course. This, perhaps, reflects once more the absence of a legal emphasis.
In the same connection, the right to be represented by counsel is subtly discouraged,
though it is never denied. The attitude prevails that an attorney is a wrench which
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is ready to be thrown into the court machinery. Attorneys are to be tolerated lest
they get the "wrong" impression of what the court is trying to do, but if they can
be induced to accept the court's motives in a spirit of cooperation to do what, in the
court's opinion, is "best for the child," so much the better. The fear commonly expressed when attempts are made to legislate the right of juveniles to counsel is that
the restrictions then imposed will prevent the court from carrying out its program of
working with the child in his best interest. In other words, the feeling is that the
attorney will stand between the court and the child. This may or may not be the
result, but it can scarcely be denied that some members of the bar unfortunately are
more interested in their clients' successful evasion of the law than in seeing that
justice is done. In any event it is better to risk the child's evasion of the law than
that he should be unjustly detained within its jurisdiction. But this is a point of view
which would undoubtedly meet with stiff opposition in the field. Juvenile court
philosophy sees no discrepancy between a consideration of the welfare of a child and
an absence of constitutional safeguards. Perhaps many practitioners feel that because their motives are of a noble strain they carry within them their own inviolable
sanctions and, therefore, deserve no interference from others. It is a presumptuous
point of view but it has the advantage of stir.ring up an endless stream of rationalizations. Under them any adopted procedures become immune to logical contradictions.
This may be illustrated by a type of disposition which is called a "protective placement." When applied to cases of delinquency, it usually turns out to be a new name
for an old practice, commitment to a correctional institution. For example, the
writer was once assigned to a case involving homosexuality. A boy of limited intelligence, whose I.Q. was about 80, had been forced to submit to a college student.
Afterwards the boy ran home to his father who called the police and had the adult
charged with a criminal offense. The police also took the boy to the juvenile detention home. On the police paper no charges were stated, only the circumstances leading up to detention. (The boy had had one previous appearance for truancy, after
which his attendance had improved.) At the hearing the boy was sent to a reformatory "for his own protection." The assumption underlying such a commitment is
that the reformatory has a successful organization capable of treating this type of
problem and that the boy would be better off there than at home. Ironically, the
adult in this case was freed in criminal court as the boy was not a very capable
witness.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The main points of contention concerning juvenile court procedures may be summarized as follows:
(1) Because there has been a strong reaction against the abuse of criminal
procedures applied to children, much that was essential to the protection of individual rights has been eliminated in the laws relating to adjudication and treatment of delinquency.
Some of the features of criminal procedure which have been eliminated are here
considered not to be inconsistent with the welfare of a child.
(2) The idea that the specific offense of which the child is accused is irrelevant
in a rehabilitative approach is also rejected.
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A specific offense may be irrelevant for treatment after a child has been adjudged
delinquent, but not before..One must consider the grounds on which one is entitled
to attempt the rehabilitation of any child and those grounds are fundamentally legal.
Adjudication should merely establish the right to treat and the conditions under
which treatment is to take place. As treatment now stands, it is mainly conducted
within the official imagination. The attitude seems to be that if a child "needs" treatment, keeping him under the protective wing of the court in and of itself is beneficial.
(3) Most juvenile courts are probably not equipped to deal with problems not
tied to violations of law.
Cases involving psychological, domestic and other problems where no delinquency
is found should be referred to other agencies but only on a voluntary basis.
The juvenile courts' indiscriminateness in taking all kinds of cases is a large part
of the problem. Many seem to think that the juvenile court should do all things,
but in effect this permits the court to do only the easy, the immediate and the practical things and to neglect the difficult and important treatment of the most serious
delinquents. In confusing its role with that of parents the juvenile court succeeds
only in spreading its efforts thinly.
(4) Despite statements of philosophy to the contrary, the ideals of rehabilitation in practice may give way to punitive judgments depending upon the nature
of the offense and any bias of the court.
Such bias could be checked by statutory limitations prescribing specific penalties.
(5) The philosophy or frame of reference of the juvenile court is not effectively
transmitted to the court "public."
Most people whose children are referred to the court do not visualize it as a social
agency. For the most part the writer believes the court public associates procedures
with a punitive ideology requiring traditional safeguards such as right to counsel,
right to confront witnesses, and so on. The court cannot operate well beyond the
limits of public definition and the attempt to do so may limit an already limited
efficiency.
(6) Present procedures, including the practice of conducting pre-hearing investigations and the emphasis on minor and problem cases, overtaxes probation
facilities.
The time now given almost exclusively to court hearings might be more profitably
spent in developing a systematic approach to treatment. In this respect an administrative separation of the courts and probation departments seems advisable. Probation
staffs themselves could decide upon an area of function with the aim of bringing ideals
to the level of reality. Limitations should be outlined and insignificant details omitted
from the job.
(7) The young delinquent and his family are not usually informed of what rights
they do possess under existing law.
On the contrary, there is an assumption that no violation of rights is possible.
(8) The state has no fundamental right to impose control over those who have
committed no offense.
In other words, "treatment" by the court aimed at preventing delinquency is unjustified even if the court were equipped to provide such treatment. In addition
knowledge has not yet advanced to the point where delinquency can be predicted
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unquestionably in any individual case. The current use of subtle distinctions, such
as filing a petition "on behalf of" a child rather than against him, does not alter the
inherently legal and fundamentally punitive character of the juvenile court's processing of delinquents. And if the court puts its own rubber stamp of approval on all its
activities, that is no assurance that all it does is for the benefit of the child.
(9) Once a petition has been filed against a child, there is often a presumption
of delinquency.
If there is not always a presumption of delinquency, there is at least the presumption that the child needs the "help" of the court. In many cases there is a decided
reluctance on the part of the court to let the matter rest when no obvious delinquency
is involved. On the contrary, the attempt is made to find either some problem or some
other delinquency not connected with the current charge.
(10) The sometimes indiscriminate acceptance of cases held for the court's
adjudication overloads the court calendar and frequently results in an insufficient
amount of time given to a consideration of average cases.
(11) The results of a law nebulously formulated have been: (1) an increase in
the powers of the court acquired through administrative procedures, (2) a circumvention of traditional legal procedures and, (3) the emergence of an implicit and
sometimes explicit attitude that the court is another social agency.
There is in some quarters a feeling of pride in the anti-legal approach to the handling of offenders and apparently little or no realization of the very real abuses which
may be involved.
If the points outlined above are correct, and many of them can be objectively verified, then the decisions of some state supreme courts are a hollow mockery.14 In in re
Holmes the appellant, Joseph Holmes, age 16, had been committed to the Pennsylvania Industrial School "on his prior record, his present activities, the failure of his
parents to control him, and the desirability of his receiving the training provided
in such an institution." The only proven offense of this boy had been operating a motor
vehicle without a license. Five days later a delinquency petition charged him with
participation in the armed robbery of a church, an allegation- which was not conclusively substantiated. From this and from similar decisions in the past is the public
to believe that incarceration, commitment to a reformatory, constitutes "helping,"
"salvaging," "safeguarding" a boy by throwing around him "the strong arm of the
State"? Are the sacrosanct motives and purposes of the state then to justify its interference in the lives of any hapless child and his parents merely on the implicit
assumption that stated motives and purposes are identical with their realization?
The point is not that the state should not step in to help "save" a child, but does the
child need to be "saved," and if so, does it need to be saved by the state? The difficulty
is in allowing decisions about a need to save to the discretion of judges of juvenile
courts and their staffs. The criteria for public interference with the freedom of action
of any individual, child or adult, should be stated in the law. To this end present
laws need to be reexamined, modified and even re-written entirely. They need to consider that the mere declaration of a procedure to be non-criminal does not justify
14In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603, 109 A.2d 523, 524 (1954).
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infringement of personal rights. The speciousness of the reasoning which has supported juvenile court philosophy has been most skillfully highlighted by Tappan:
The presumption is commonly adopted that since the state has determined to protect and save
its wards, it will do no injury to them through its diverse officials, so that these children need no
due process protections against injury. Several exposures to court; a jail remand of days, weeks, or
even months; a long period in a correctional school with young thieves, muggers, and murderersthese can dono conceivable harm if the state's purpose be beneficient and the procedure be "chancery!"
Children are adjudicated in this way every day without visible manifestations of due process. They
are incarcerated. They become adult criminals, too, in thankless disregard of the state's. good intentions as "paiens palriae."15

It is time for an "agonizing reappraisal."
15TA'PAN, op. cit., p. 205.

